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I would like to offer you today what some would consider a
cynical view or a cynical perspective. The reason is to alert you to
the hurdles and difficulties that one faces in the field of international
criminal justice because to truly be an idealist, you have to know
what the hurdles are and learn how to overcome them. Otherwise,
you become an ineffective idealist.
When I was first appointed Chairman of the Security Council
Commission and had the pleasure of meeting Professor David
Scheffer, we were running into a lot of obstacles, most of which
were coming from the U.N. bureaucracy. And at the beginning, I
was convinced that this was a product of a mastermind conspiracy,
until one of my fellow workers who had been at the U.N. for a long
time said, “You really don’t need to think of conspiracies when you
have the U.N. bureaucracy to deal with. It is capable of creating all
of the hurdles of whatever conspiracy you can imagine and even
more.” And so I spent the next two years having to deal with the
budgetary difficulties and the authorizations and the issuances of
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contracts and things which you all deal with and which are such
significant impediments to an effective functioning of it.
Suddenly you find yourself, notwithstanding all of your good
intentions and your good will in making the tribunal work, trying to
advance the cases, cases that are taking an inordinate amount of
time, with the tribunals getting blamed for their high costs and their
slowness. Then it’s time to close the circle and come back to the
conspiracy theory and say, well, maybe there was some method to
the madness of those who are doing that because you know, when
you ultimately come back and you say, all right, let’s look at these
tribunals over the last few years and how many people have been
indicted and how many of them have been convicted; what is the
average length of a case and how much does it cost, and you say it
costs an average of ten million dollars to prosecute a person. Big
question mark—how long is international criminal justice law going
to continue? So you not only have the questions, at what price is
international criminal justice and what is the effectiveness of it, but
you also have those big questions about time and cost.
At which point I, having completed my various U.N.
assignments, thought maybe I’ll engage in an academic exercise of
trying to find out what really happened in the field of conflicts since
the end of World War II. And I went to a number of databases
showing the number of conflicts and the number of victimizations,
none of which were very satisfactory. Probably the best one is at the
University of Michigan, which is working with a project in Sweden.
It’s understandable that you have difficulty in determining
particularly the number of victims or contexts of different conflicts
and also the legal characterization of the conflict so that you know
under which category you’re going to put them.
To give you a little bit of the raw data: after two and a half
years of research with forty-three researchers working on five
regions in the world, we came up with an estimate of 313 conflicts
that took place in the world from 1948 to 2008, with a total number
of victims—92 million people. You’ve got to stop and think—92
million people killed. Comparatively, that’s twice as many people
killed as in World Wars I and II put together. You sort of shift back
from reading the hard data to something else and the something else
that came to my mind is, whatever happened to the “never again?”
You sort of do a psychological double take and you say, wait a
minute. We just finished World War II and suddenly as of 1948 we
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have 313 conflicts, 92 million people dead, twice as many as World
Wars I and II put together.
What did that produce? Did we reach something Professor
Scheffer has been actively working on, namely, the responsibility to
protect and thus some action, some intervention? What’s the record
of the Security Council? How many people were prosecuted? And I
thought of asking a few more questions to our team of researchers. I
said, “Let me ask you a general question. What did states in which
these conflicts occurred do?” Our common experience would tell
you that most states did nothing. But I said, let me try to prove it.
And one of the indicia was that 127 countries had the audacity of
passing general amnesty orders. And this was open and above
board, unabashed. You know, wipe the slate clean—nobody
committed any crime, no responsibility. You look at the rest and
you start seeing selective prosecutions as you have seen in
Argentina, or in Chile. And a thought came to my mind, “Well, let’s
get a few sociologists and statisticians together and say—assuming
we had 92 million people killed and 313 conflicts over a 60-year
period, how many people would it take to kill 92 million people?”
So the statisticians went back and forth and it went from one
to three million people, and they took as a model both Nazi Germany
and the USSR and said: if you have a certain genocide that involves
the entire bureaucracy, such as the Nazis, you required a lot of
people. But in a situation like Rwanda, yes, you required a lot of
people as individuals but you’re not involving an entire bureaucracy
because no bureaucracy for all practical purposes existed. It was not
an institutionalized system of violence within a bureaucratic
system—it was institutionalized within a movement more than
anything else. Suddenly the sociologists gave them all sorts of
distinctions as to how you’re going to classify these types of
collective manifestations of violence. I said, all right. Let me settle
for one million. That is a minimum figure we’re not going to
dispute.
And then we started looking actually at what I call the
incongruities of international humanitarian law.
If you’re Hamas, and you’re trapped in Gaza and you have
no way of leaving, and Israel has planes and tanks, what is the only
weapon you can have? You can send suicide bombers, kill civilians,
and send crude rockets, no matter where they land. That is the only
way you’re going to be able to respond to your opponent in any
manner, whether it’s meaningful or not meaningful is not the
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question. And then you find that in addition to that, you’re dealing
basically with people who engage in violence, who are not state
actors, and who in addition to having to redress the military
imbalance in the asymmetry of power, need to redress also the
financial imbalance or economic imbalance. In other words, they
need to fund their activities. And how are they going to fund their
activities?
And suddenly you see a shifting of the gears which
international criminal law does not recognize, from the combatant in
the theoretically pure sense of the word to those who engage in
organized crime.
It becomes an organized crime activity
indispensible to the funding of their activities. At which point you
realize when you start sorting through these conflicts, that it’s not
that clear when these people started as genuine, ideologically
motivated non-state actors and when they shifted to be a part of
organized crime or whether it is the other way around. Charles
Taylor wound up being a head of state claiming to be involved in
some type of armed conflict, but in reality he started simply in
organized crime activity. At what point are you going to distinguish
Hamas as a genuine national liberation group fighting for whatever
Marxist ideals they have, and at what point do you distinguish them
as the protectors of the trafficking and drugs business in Gaza?
Now, their argument is that they need to do that in order to
support their ideologically motivated military campaign, but the
moment you get the mixture of that, you suddenly realize, wait a
minute—if nothing else, international law in general, and
international criminal law in particular, is woefully deficient because
what it does is it compartmentalizes conduct without realizing that in
reality there is no such compartmentalization.
You suddenly realize, we’re getting back to the old theory of
conspiracy here. Is there really some method to the madness of the
international legislative process? Is it purposely designed or built to
fail? Well, it’s not really built to fail, but it’s built to work
inefficiently in order to create wiggle room and escape hatches for
senior members of government. That’s what it’s all about and
basically, we really haven’t changed much throughout history.
States still pursue their national interests, their strategic interests,
their power and wealth goals, and these prevail. International
criminal justice is not yet one of the values of an international,
globalized society and until it becomes part of it, and until states
realize that these values are not incompatible with their interests, that
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their interests can best be achieved through the pursuit of these
values, we will continue to see a perpetuation of a conflict between
Realpolitik and international criminal justice.
And through this conflict you now see how in a sense this
amorphous thing we call the international community has now
realized that it has to pay some lip service to international criminal
justice. And so what it does is, it says, “How do we co-opt
international criminal justice? What is it that you want? You want
international criminal tribunals? Okay, we’ll give you international
tribunals. For Yugoslavia and Rwanda it’s going to be limited to
these conflicts and then it’s going to be subject to the Security
Council and then it’s going to be subject to Special Modalities in
terms of funding.” Then we’re going to come to the point and say,
“You know what, it’s time for you guys to go.” And then we’re
going to be able to say, “You know, we gave you the international
tribunals. Look at what they did…We have Miloševiü!” And then
you stop for a minute and you say, “Now wait a minute. Wait, wait,
wait… Let’s run this thing backwards. When did we get Miloševiü?
After Dayton? After he started bombing Kosovo?” Is there any hint
that in the event that he was not going to be that stupid to go bomb
Kosovo he could’ve gotten a pass? I don’t know. I’m not into the
latest developments of the Court, but I have to ask myself the
question, why aren’t Miloševiü’s assets seized? Why are Mrs.
Miloševiü and his son living happily in Russia, spending the money?
And, by the way, how did these blood diamonds circulate?
Something about DeBeers company buying them and then the
money was sort of nicely laundered again through Swiss banks
which allowed certain Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarus arms dealers
to be able to provide the arms by transshipping them through Dubai.
You look at all of that and you say, “Now wait a minute. Where is
the will of the international community to connect the dots that
would make it more difficult for the commission of international
crimes?”
But who is going to speak for the 92 million people who have
been killed in the last sixty years? 92 million, and it’s not one or
two. Think about it. It’s almost incredible; it’s almost impossible for
the human mind to absorb this enormous number. And you have to
pause and see that the situation that we face is a situation in which
those of us who are going to be committed to international criminal
justice as part of human rights have to come to the realization that
international criminal justice is a way of enforcing human rights,
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much as in domestic law. We have to come to recognize that the use
of criminal law is the enforcement of other social interests by harsher
means than by having simple civil damages or sanctions. We also
are going to have to come to the realization that we have many dots
in the firmament of international criminal law. And these dots aren’t
connected. In less than 100 years, we have adopted over 285
international conventions on international criminal law. They’re
divided into 28 different categories, and again I’m coming back to
what I was saying in terms of the legislative policy concerning
terrorism. Why don’t we have a comprehensive convention? Why
don’t we have a comprehensive mechanism? Why don’t we have
connections between organized crime and money laundering and
conflicts of a non-international character and international character
and so on and so forth? If the purpose of the international legislative
policy is to minimize the crimes, to achieve a higher level of
prevention, to produce a higher level of deterrence, and as a result to
minimize the harm, we have to focus on these connections.
Shortly after I finished my function at the Rome conference
(1998), which Professor Scheffer addressed, I found myself
appointed without being asked, and unknowingly, by the
Commission on Human Rights as the Independent Expert on Victim
Compensation. So I went to Geneva, still with a little bit of idealism
left in me and forgetting all of the lessons that I should have learned
in my many prior years and said, “Oh, wow, now we’re going to
move ahead and there will be a U.N. resolution on the protection of
victims.” After two years we produced a very viable declaration on
the rights of the victims of crime and compensation. And this was
just before the U.N. conference on racism in Durban. And suddenly
the U.S. came and said, “Wait a minute. You can’t go any further
with that,” and marshaled all of the European countries and said,
“Do you realize that if this is adopted, then in America all of the
former slaves will ask for compensation? And you know what, you
Europeans have acted as colonizers in all of these African and Asian
countries, so you too are going to be exposed.” So suddenly, totally
unexpectedly, I found a huge coalition of countries opposed to the
work that I was doing, and it took from 2002 until 2006, four years
of diplomatic efforts, to get the resolution adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in 2006. Every one of these governments made a
statement saying, “This is not mandatory. This is not binding. This is
soft law.” Their aim was to minimize it.
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One of the provisions I put in was that part of the rights of
victims is their right to see people who committed the crimes
investigated, and if the investigation produces sufficient evidence,
for them to be prosecuted and punished. That was the most hard
fought provision. You want money, it’s okay. But don’t come
seeking prosecution. Of course, built in that little section dealing
with prosecution was the removal of impunities of heads of states,
and that really hurt. We have to develop new thinking. It’s not very
innovative, it’s not very imaginative. We’re still fighting the same
old battles under new forms and new shapes. We have to continue to
support existing international institutions, existing international
tribunals, and move them ahead, but we have to also realize that
within a short period of time we may find ourselves with nothing
else but the ICC as the only gig in town. And we all have our
concerns, either because of the slow start of the ICC or because of a
variety of decisions by its prosecutors. We all have to be also
concerned about the possible future politicization of the ICC.
I think the future is going to rely more on what is called the
complementarity approach to international criminal justice—how do
we strengthen national capacity and develop national criminal justice
systems? And you know we unfortunately do not see many
developed countries in the world, such as the U.S. and those within
the E.U. and others, putting resources into developing national
capacity-building and national legal systems in order to have these
national legal systems take over the task of prosecution.
Realpolitik prevails. I hope you will forgive me if I conclude
with this contemporary note. As you can see, even events in Egypt
demonstrate that the military junta is going to continue to remain in
power. This military junta was established in 1952 and it continues.
It is engaged in massive human rights violations and torture in
Egypt. The United States government has not seen fit to condemn
these practices. On the contrary it has supported it. It is quite likely
that the army will use its military forces to repress the popular
uprising. If that’s the case, it will be a violation of U.S. law because
U.S. law prohibits the use of U.S. military assistance for a violation
of human rights. But neither the President nor the Secretary of State
mentioned anything in their announcement on the subject.
So, in a sense it is business as usual. Egypt has been the
recipient of extraordinary renditions and torture on behalf of and for
the United States. Many countries continue their practices of torture.
The United States claims that it upholds its laws, its Constitution,
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and international laws, and yet we have seen the institutionalization
of torture by senior officials in the prior administration. We have
seen a number of lawyers violate their code of ethics by producing
legal opinions that are contrary to international and domestic law. It
is not only a question of Guantanamo with over 800 people who
have been tortured. It’s an estimated 150,000 people who have been
tortured in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last nine years in addition to
the extraordinary renditions. In this context, an estimated 200
people have been killed under torture, at least those we know of.
None of the lawyers have been brought to bar, even to question their
ethics.
Not only have the architects of the Bush Administration’s
torture been allowed to pass, they’ve been allowed to brag about it
on television, to put it in books, and to sell it and make money out of
it and to get away with it. And those who perpetrated the torture,
with the exception of a few lowly soldiers who received minor
disciplinary action, were not prosecuted. Nobody even speaks of the
doctors and medical professionals who participated in furthering the
torture and prolonged the suffering of those who had been tortured.
If we let this go by, then what else are we going to let go by in terms
of violations of our international legal obligations, of our
Constitutions, of our criminal laws under U.S.C. Title 18, of our
criminal laws under the Uniform Code of Military Justice? It is so
tragic that this is happening, and it is even worse that American
public opinion remains so indifferent about it. When we look back
at the history of atrocity crimes, it is not so much the few who
commit the crimes that count, but it is the many who remain
indifferent to these crimes that make them possible.



